The recent liberalization of Singapore's financial sector causes its fund management industry to expand rapidly. As of December 1, 1998 there were already 191 unit trusts to choose from.
INTRODUCTION
The local unit trust industry has grown phenomenally since the launch of Singapore's first unit trust, First Singapore Fund, in 1958. The recent liberalisation of Singapore's financial sector accelerated its fund management industry. As of December 1, 1998, there were a total of 191 unit trusts for an investor to choose from. Last year Peter Douglas of Aberdeen Asset Management Asia predicted that in five years' time, there will be 300 to 400 unit trusts available in Singapore with perhaps S$10 billion of assets under management . In particular, with the liberalisation of the Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme (CPFIS) in February 1998, the number of CPF-approved unit trusts has increased from 21 in March 1998 to the current 53.
Eventually, Singapore, like the United States and Hong Kong, will have more unit trusts available to investors than stocks listed on the exchange.
In recent years, Singapore's fund management industry experienced three unprecedented upheavals in its previously rather placid business environment: Under the impact of the recent challenges, there is now much better industry awareness of professional risk management practices and more realism than three years ago. The quality of both the survey responses and of the reported risk management practices has improved. The 1998 response rate was 25.9%: 41 of the 158 questionnaires sent out in September 1998, were returned by December 1998.
This was up from 16.8% (21 out of 125) in 1997 and 11.4% (9 out of 79) in 1996.
2 Regrettably, despite the recent market upheavals, two thirds of the unit trusts do not provide any risk analysis to their unit holders, because it is still considered: "not common practice". On the other hand, Singapore unit trusts diversified more to the developed and stable markets in North America and Europe to reduce their optimal portfolio risk. There remains an undue concentration on equity investments, and the currency risk exposure remains high. Only half of the respondents hedged their currency risk. However, 70.4% of the respondents in the fall of 1998 thought that it was already an excellent time to pick up common stocks at bargain prices in the region.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews previous research in this area and discusses the design of the survey questionnaire. Based on the survey, Section 3 provides the background of the respondents and their investment styles. Section 4 provides an inside in what the Singapore unit trusts disclose to their clients in terms of return (sufficient disclosure) and risk (insufficient disclosure) and to what variety and magnitudes of risk they are actually exposed. Responses were collected regarding the most important market risks: country, currency, equity, and interest rate and credit risks. Also was asked what risk management tools the Singapore unit trusts currently use to measure these risks and how much they disclose of their risk analysis to the unit holders. In Section 5, we look at a diversity of back-room risks: liquidity, operational, regulatory and human factor risks faced by the unit trusts. Finally,
Section 6 discloses what Singapore fund managers think of the increased competition, 2 Los (Winter 1998/99) .
the current regulation of the industry and the effectiveness of the market promoting strategies of the Singapore government, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis.
The Conclusions section contains some recommendations and expectations regarding the future of the disclosure of risks among unit trusts in Singapore.
REVIEW AND DESIGN
The preliminary survey three years ago was inspired by a 1995 Biennial Performance Survey (with a 17.3% response rate) of 550 money managers by The Spaulding
Group, a consulting firm in New Jersey and information provider to the money management industry in the USA. Morningstar Inc., the firm in Chicago, which monitors ca. 10,000 mutual funds in the USA, provides a reasonable standard of disclosure of risk management. Currently, the Association for Investment Research and Management recommends performance presentation standards for fund management on a global basis (Cf. AIMR, 1996 and . Technical details of the various risk performance measures, and the motivation for each of these measures, can be found in the recent book by Spaulding (1997) .
The book by Bernstein (1995) inspired questions related to style investing, which provide a unique insight into equity management. Considering that many unit trusts are offered to the public both domestic and foreign banks in Singapore and that derivatives become a more important ingredient of the investment menu, a few questions related to Value-at-Risk were also included, following Jorion (1997) .
In the first survey in 1996 (Cf. Lim, Lim and Tan, 1997) , it was found that most unit trusts in Singapore were equity funds and most funds did not provide comprehensive risk analysis to the public and rarely disclosed information about their risks and fund managers to the public. Next year's survey reported that Singapore unit trusts still did not disclose adequately their risk management practices to investors, which could be a negative force impeding the growth to maturity of the unit trust industry in Singapore (Cf. Ong, Lim, Lim, 1998 
BACKGROUND AND STYLES
This section discusses the core results from the survey on background, selfcategorized investment styles and degree of disclosure and transparency of the unit trusts in Singapore.
Background
Here we review the self-categorization of Singapore's unit trusts, their asset allocation in the fall of 1998, income distribution, the adoption of formal investment policies, their disclosure of manager background and how much they claim to be in compliance with the AIMR Standards. An investment policy acts as a signpost for fund managers to achieve their investment objectives and to satisfy their risk tolerance. It helps fund managers to stay focused in the execution of investment strategies, as well as to help guard against excessive risk taking in any particular sector or country. To investors, an investment policy aids in the selection of unit trusts with investments or exposure that matches the investors' risk-return objectives. Hence, it is encouraging to see that there has been a steady improvement in the number of unit trusts that have articulated investment policies, in addition to what little they can register with, from 63% in 1996 to 90% in 1997 and 93% in 1998.
Sample size: 39
On the other hand, it is disheartening to see the percentage of unit trusts that provide fund manager information, e.g., the educational background and years of experience, fall from 1997's 62.5% (10 out of 16) to this year's 24.2% (8 out of 33). Such information is important for assuring investors that their savings are in good hands.
Fourteen (58.3%) unit trusts indicated that the provision of manager background information is "not common practice" in Singapore. (See also Section 5.4).
On the other hand, 88.9% of the 36 respondents stated that their management teams are now undergoing training in risk management and 93.8% stated that they differentiated between functional areas to reduce operational risk. Indeed, 70.7% of the 41 respondents stated to be very well protected from unethical practices by their management team and 29.3% were well protected. This emphasizes the "clean practice" standards for which Singapore is rightfully famous. The team approach to investing is favored among Singapore's unit trusts and "stars" among the (mostly very young) unit trusts managers are (still) unheard off. About three-quarter of the teams consist of less than five people, most of them engaged in research and analysis.
Slightly more than half (51.9%) of 27 respondents claimed that they are in compliance with the AIMR Performance Presentation Standards, an improvement over last year's 31%. The five unit trusts which responded to the second part of this question indicated the reason for not implementing the AIMR standards as "not a regulatory requirement", while three indicated that it is "not a common practice". Only one of the respondents cited high costs and questionable benefits as the reason for not implementing the AIMR Standards. The low rate of compliance may be related to the fact that 62.9% of these unit trusts are available only in Singapore. Singapore does have a reasonable number of Chartered Financial Analysts (CFA), but more than a fifth is employed by the GIC and the others are mostly portfolio managers in brokerdealer investment banking, with few CFAs in local fund management positions of importance.
Investment Styles
Not surprisingly for Asian Tigers, as Table 1 shows, 14 (56%) out of 25 respondents indicated "growth" as their equity investment style. Growth style managers look for companies that offer above-average opportunities for growth. Out of these 14, five are of large size, seven of medium size and two of small size. Rather in contrast to Singapore's usual "kiasu" style of investing, only one of 25 respondents adopted the value investment style. Value style managers focus on potential value gains, looking for opportunities when stocks are "cheap". Ten of 25 responding unit trusts were of the blend investment style, i.e., a mix of growth and value styles, with seven in the medium size category. Still, three possible style categories were still missing from this spectrum and opportunities for niche marketing exist. Regarding the various bond investment styles, Table 2 shows that seven of the nine responding unit trusts indicate that they have a medium maturity period, of which, five are of medium quality and two are of high quality fixed income style. Only two are of the short maturity, high quality fixed income style. It is clear that bond styles are underrepresented in Singapore: only three out of nine possible style categories are available to the public. There should be more choices to invest in bonds. Figure 3 summarizes the risk characteristics of Singapore's unit trusts for both 1997 and 1998. In 1998 more funds were self-categorized as aggressive, while in 1997 the majority of the funds was described as neutral. With the increase in the proportion of self-styled aggressive funds, more emphasis should be placed on better risk management. 
DISCLOSURE OF RETURN AND RISK
This Section looks at the kind of information Singapore's unit trusts disclose to their unit holders, in particular the disclosure of the returns and of the risks involved in achieving those returns. It also reviews the risk management tools currently in practice by unit trust managers in Singapore.
7 On April 4, 1998, IMAS started to produce a monthly ranking of 127 unit trusts in Singapore, based on only their returns and accumulated returns, without accounting for the risks involved, similar to the Business Week's "Mutual Fund Scoreboard "in the USA. This return ranking can be accessed on the web: http://www.imas.org.sg/html/unittrustfr.html
Disclosure of Returns
In accordance with the monthly IMAS ranking, which became available last year, 22
(56.4%) of 39 respondents indicated that they do provide the general public with rates of return on a monthly basis. This is about the same as last year's 61%. The number of unit trusts providing information on annual rates of return increased from zero to six this year. Higher reporting frequency and time frames are beneficial for both investors and fund management teams as they provide greater insight into how the managers' investment strategies are performing, and how their accounts are doing relative to benchmarks and to each other. Figure 4 summarizes how the frequency of disclosure on rates of return has changed over the past year. The proportion of unit trusts presenting accumulated total returns to unit holders on a short-term basis for one and two years increased sharply. First, many funds in Singapore are very young and have only short historical records of two to three years.
But this picture will gradually mature. Second, the new guidelines regarding disclosure to unit holders and the CPF Board require that certain information be disclosed on a quarterly and half-yearly basis, to the CPF Board and unit holders, respectively.
8
Only two trusts presented accumulated total return rates for periods exceeding five years. This is in agreement with the unit trusts' claim that their average investment horizons are now between one and five years. It was considerably shorter in the first two surveys. Apparently, the view of the unit trust managers in Singapore is changing from short term, trading oriented, "money" management to "medium term", multicurrency, "buy-and-hold' strategic management.
Disclosure of Risks
The questionnaire asked which type of risk was considered to be most important in the eyes of a unit trust manager in Singapore. Several respondents ticked more than one type, a sure sign that, in these times of volatile market conditions, no particular type of risk dominates. The unit trust managers are also increasingly becoming aware of the need to address and mitigate various risks that they are subject to. But in contrast to the preceding two years, 14 (45.2%) of the 39 responding units ranked equity risk as the most important risk, while 11 (35.5%) of them considered country risk on par with interest rate risk. This was followed by currency risk on par with liquidity risk (8), as shown in Figure 6 . The implication is that Singapore unit trust managers now tend to focus their risk management techniques and tools on alleviating such risks. The results of Figure 6 are consistent with the finding that the majority of the unit trusts in Singapore are equity funds, and that most have a regional or global theme in their investment policies. Only 12 (32.4%) out of 37 respondents indicated that they provide a risk analysis of their unit trust for their unit holders. Of these 12, ten provide such information qualitatively, while two do so both quantitatively and quantitatively. Of the 25 respondents (67.6%) who had stated that they do not provide a risk analysis for their unit holders, 19 cited the reason that it is "not a common practice", while three attributed it to the absence of regulatory requirements.
In addition, only 21 (75%) of the 28 responding unit trusts in Singapore was willing to reveal their average sector weightings. Thus it is very difficult for unit trust holders in
Singapore to form even a rough idea of the risk exposure of his share in the unit trust.
It is clear that the majority of the unit trusts in Singapore do not offer their clients information about the investment risks involved. Even among those few unit trusts, which do, most do not provide the information in quantitative form.
Perhaps, the underlying reason for this finding is the low level of investor sophistication in Singapore, which in turn results in unit trust companies presuming that such information would not prove useful to investors at large, due to their lack of knowledge and skill in interpreting such information. Substantial changes can then be expected to come, because the retail investor in Singapore is becoming quickly more sophisticated, especially now with the recent move towards a disclosure-based regulation regime and the influx of foreign mutual funds for sale.
Actual Exposure to Market Risks

Country Risk
As is to be expected of a small city-state, 38, or 95% of 40 responding funds invest overseas, mostly in Hong Kong (26), several emerging markets -Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and, surprisingly few still, in mainland China, as shown in Table 3 . As in previous years, 25 responding unit trusts in Singapore rank economic risk as the most important factor to take into consideration when investing overseas. Political risk is ranked second, regulatory risk third and natural calamity risk as fourth. For 19 respondents, Singapore was once again the ASEAN country with the lowest political risk, followed closely by Brunei, The Philippines and Thailand. With the recent political pandemonium in Indonesia, it is not surprising that it is ranked as the second most politically risky country in the region this year. The most politically risky country, according to these unit trust managers, is Cambodia.
Currency, Equity and Interest Rate Risks
Among those, which invest in foreign assets, 13 of 28 respondents in 1998 are more than 75% invested in foreign currency assets, translating into potentially high currency risk exposures. This is not surprising, since most of the unit trusts in Singapore have regional and global investment policies. Figure 7 shows that, comparing 1998 with 1997, there is a larger proportion of our respondents with less than 25% of their funds invested in foreign currency assets, but a considerable larger proportion with a 75%-100% currency exposure. This is in line with our earlier observation of the two groups of Singapore fund managers. One group withdrew from the foreign markets, possibly being hurt by the Asian Financial Crisis. The other group increased their foreign exposure, but now further away from the South-East Asian region to less correlated and more stable North-America and Western Europe, to increase their diversification and reduce their unsystematic risk exposure. Among 27 responding unit trusts, only eight classified their exposure to currency risk as very much, while 19 regarded it either small or neutral. This could be attributed to the fact that several fund managers use now sophisticated hedges against currency risks, as shown in Figure 11 , mostly by forwards and option hedges. The nine unit trusts that indicated "none" of the listed hedging instruments are used stated that they rely on currency diversification to reduce currency risks. Of 30 respondents, an overwhelming 27 (90%) declared that they have more than 40% of their funds invested in equities. This is consistent with the response to an earlier question where equity risk was among those to be considered of greatest importance. In the aftermath of the Asian financial Crisis, which caused stock markets in the region first to collapse and then (some) to recover), it should come as no surprise that 23 (88.5%) of the 26 responding firms felt very much affected by the volatility of the stock markets. Fifteen of these funds coped very well, but eleven only moderately well. However, no less than 19 unit trusts thought it was time to pick up sound stocks at bargain prices.
There are few bond specialists among Singapore's unit trust managers, but five out of ten respondents indicated that they use duration analysis for measuring interest rate risk. Also, three use duration targets for individual portfolios, one uses them for the entire balance sheet, and one uses them for both of the above. Further one unit trust uses the appropriate zero-coupon yield for the computation of modified duration, whereas four trusts use a separate rate for each portfolio item.
Concentration Risk
Regarding concentration risk, the respondents were asked to give a breakdown of their sectoral allocations. Although most unit trusts in Singapore don't provide this kind of detailed information to their clients, the results in Table 4 , for 18 respondents, show that many allocations are relatively small (<5%), imply that for most unit trusts there is a substantial degree of sectoral diversification. However, the level of concentration risk inherent within a unit trust would ultimately be a function of its investment objectives as outlined in its policy. The more popular sectors invested in by unit trusts in Singapore are energy, financial, and technology. In fact, 21 (75%) of the 28 respondents did not provide sectoral disclosure of their assets to their unit holders. But the seven who did represented a marked improvement over last year, when none of the 16 respondents to this same question provided such disclosure. Still, this aspect of disclosure leaves much to be desired, considering that it is a common practice to disclose such pertinent information in the United States, as
shown by the mutual fund fact sheets of MorningStar Inc., for example.
Credit Risks
Given that the Asian Financial Crisis was exacerbated by weak bank lending standards and the resulting non-performing loans, one would expect increased interest among the fund managers in the issue of credit risk, were it not that only 11 (27.5%) out of 40 respondents have some bond exposure in Singapore. Only five unit trusts can be considered bond funds and these five (out of 23 respondents) indicated that they break down their investments by credit quality class and/or counterpart type.
Two did not do so, and 16 unit trusts indicated that it was not applicable since they were invested in stocks only. All five, who did consider credit risk, indicated that they have mandated or regulatory limitations with respect to the amount of funds in their unit trust that can be invested in each category. One out of six revealed an average investment horizon of less than a year, and five out of six have average investment horizons of 1-5 years. The longer the investment horizon, the higher the credit risks.
Commodity Price Risks
Considering that Southeast Asia produces a lot of raw materials -oil, gas, tin, gold, rubber, palm oil -the continued about commodity price risk is rather remarkable.
This year for the first time we obtained a few responses to this section. The commodities invested in by the two respondents are represented in the table below.
Unfortunately, we only managed to solicit one response for the next question where we tried to discover what steps are being taken to counter commodity risks. Our sole respondent indicated that this was done via diversification, to minimize the specific risk.
Risk Management Tools
Another telling response for the overall lack of analytical disclosure to the unit holders by Singapore's unit trusts was that, although 15 (75%) of the 20 responding trusts use the standard deviation of the unit trust returns to measure risk, they did not reveal this information to their unit holders. Two responding unit trusts use the beta and two Sharpe's measure to measure relative risk and risk-adjusted returns,
respectively, but only for in-house analytical purposes.
None of the unit trusts directly mentioned optimization of their portfolio along the lines of the Nobel Prize Winning mean-variance optimization of Markowitz (1991) or J.P. Morgan's Riskmetrics (Cf. Longerstacy and Spencer, 1996) . However, one unit trust uses the advanced Value-at-Risk (VaR) measure, i.e., a measure of absolute portfolio risk, which emphasizes the amount of capital that can be lost with 95%
probability, under assumption of the normality of the trust's returns. Half (5) of the responding defined fixed income funds use duration analysis to measure risk. Again, both VaR and duration analysis are only used for internal purposes.
There was an increase in the percentage of managers performing simulation analysis over the three years for stress testing. Slightly less than half of the respondents did so.
However, only 31.3% did it on a monthly basis, unlike the previous year where threequarter of them performed it monthly.
DIVERSE NON-MARKET RISKS
Besides market related risks, unit trusts fail also liquidity risk resulting from unforeseen redemptions, operational risks from the possible failure of electronic accounting systems, regulatory risks from unanticipated changes in the regulatory environment and human factor risks, the most difficult to assess of them all. How do Singapore unit trust managers view these risks?
Liquidity Risks
Unit trusts are likely to be concerned about liquidity risk produced by redemption in volatile times, such as caused by the Asian Financial Crisis. But a large majority of unit trusts in Singapore expressed confidence in being able to meet redemption needs in the event that a large number of unit holders redeem their units at the same time. In fact, only one out of 28 expressed a probability of less than 60% in the ability to do so, while 23 cited a probability of more than 80%.
Six respondents confidently set aside not more than 5% of their funds for such redemption requirements, and 20 set aside 5-10% of their funds. But two respondents projected a more conservative disposition by setting aside more than 20% of their funds, quite possibly the result of prevailing uncertainty in the market conditions they actually faced, as shown in Figure 9 . Sixteen of the 28 respondents revealed that more than 40% of their (relatively small percentage of) funds set aside for redemption purposes were invested in liquid assets.
Operational Risks
It was found that only seven (25 %) of 28 unit trusts use on-line asset management accounting systems, while 21 (75%) that use a time-interval update system indicated that information is fed to headquarters on a daily basis to compute the daily Net Asset
Value ( Twelve (46.2%) out of 26 respondents seek external investment advice when making investment decisions, which either demonstrates a need to seek independent opinion or a lack of in-house research analysts. Of these 12, half uses such advice half the time, whereas the other half uses it "on a very frequent basis". As for the 14 (53.8%) others who do not use external investment advice at all, it may reflect either confidence placed on the expertise of their own fund managers, or the availability of an internal financial analysis department. Large and resource-rich banks manage most unit trusts in Singapore.
Regulatory Risks
With the liberalization of the financial sector, regulatory risk has increased in importance in Singapore, according to the responding unit trusts. Of 40 respondents, 33 (82.5%) considered regulatory risk important as compared to only 40% (out of 5 respondents) in the first survey in 1996. Eighty-five percent anticipate changes in local regulations, and all of them said that they are proactive in doing so.
Human Factor Risks
To reduce human risk, 30 (93.8%) out of 32 of the respondents separated the unit trust teams into different functional areas. However, such efforts could be undermined by the absence of a mid-offices, as close to half of the respondents revealed that they do not have a mid-office to control information flow between the front and back office.
Or, more likely, their fund management operations are still too small to require such a facility.
In terms of qualification requirements, Figure 10 shows that in 1998 a majority of the unit trusts required their managers to have earned at lleast a bachelor degree, instead of a CFA qualification, as required by the majority of unit trusts last year. This is probably an adjustment of initially unrealistic expectations regarding the potential passing rates for the required three consecutive CFA exams, administered by the AIMR. 
COMPETITION AND REGULATION
In 1998 it became clear that the local authorities would push ahead with financial market liberalization and increase competition by allowing overseas managed mutual funds to be sold in Singapore. In response only one (2.9%) of 34 responding unit trusts felt that it would be seriously affected, in sharp contrast to previous years. This is only a tenth of the 29% reported in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.
Both in 1997 and 1998 it was said that the sales and marketing efforts would be hardest hit from the increased competition, but not how.
In 1998 of 15 respondents, 14 (93.3%) preferred disclosure-based, market enforced self-regulation. Only one preferred merit-based regulation by securities authority. In comparison, in 1996 the responses had been evenly divided. why the 1998 respondents prefer disclosure-based regulation. Currently, Singapore still has a mixture of both regimes. Acknowledges that the market is better able to decide on the merits of a transaction than the regulator. Investors take responsibility for their own investment decisions.
Pros:
♦ Transactions do not suffer from delays caused by the approval process. ♦ Promotes business and financial innovation since companies are not slowed down by regulatory requirements. ♦ Greater investment choice. ♦ Increased liquidity.
Cons:
♦ Investors are not protected against making poor investment decisions.
Merit-based regime:
New listings, transactions and disclosure reviewed and decided by securities regulator on the basis of their perceived merits.
Pros:
♦ Investors protected to some degree as regulator sieves out some problem areas and assesses risk.
Cons:
♦ Delay, loss of business efficiency, flexibility and missed opportunities because transactions need clearance on case-by-case basis. ♦ Securities regulator may not necessarily be in a position to verify information. ♦ Discourages personal responsibility and self-reliance.
Straits Times 27 May 1998, "Move Forward With Disclosure-based Rules".
Private Industry Association IMAS
Contrary to the results of the preceding two years, an overwhelming 36 (97.3%) of 37 respondents in this year's survey consider the newly registered Investment Management Association of Singapore (IMAS) a suitable private body for the setting of ethical guidelines and standard practices. In inimitable Singapore style, a former MAS official, Mrs. Elizabeth Sam chairs this private body.
The only respondent who felt otherwise stated that a public body should shoulder the responsibility. One reason could be that that manager felt that the interest of the general public is not adequately represented, or perhaps, that there is lack of enforceability for any standards or guidelines set by the Association. However, private investment management associations, like the AIMR in the USA, have shown that market-based rule, combined with public censure and possible withdrawal of Charters provides very effective enforceability and adequate protection of the public interests. This is especially so when such private actions are in line with elementary Investment Advisory Services laws, such as enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission, to protect the interests of the small investors. Figure 12 shows how the respondents rated the effectiveness of the various strategies proposed and implemented by the Government to develop the local unit trust industry.
Perceived Effectiveness of Government Strategies
The majority, 17 (68%) of the 25 respondents found that the liberalization of the CPF Unit Trust scheme, together with the enhancement of the distribution channels, would be (very) effective government strategies to develop Singapore into a premier fund management center in Asia. Placing out more GIC funds and improved regulations and tax incentives closely followed this.
With regard to public education, one respondent said that it was not effective as a strategy due to still low penetration. One respondent also indicated that the development of the bond and equity markets is ineffective, and this could be attributed to the fact that the local retail markets in Singapore are still too small. 
Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis
When asked how they view the Asian Financial Crisis, an absolute majority of 70.4%
of the 27 respondents indicated that the turmoil is a time to pick up sound stocks at bargain prices, while 11.1% feel that it is a time to pull out of Asian markets. This is an encouraging sign as it reflects that most funds are cautiously optimistic that Asian markets will recover and that Asia still has good investment potential. But, there are also funds, which commented that the turmoil is a time to adopt a more defensive strategy by maintaining higher cash weightings. Because of this financial turmoil, 17
(60.7%) of 28 respondents have changed their unit trust's cash allocation. All the 12 funds that responded to the second part of this question increased their cash allocation, which ranged between 5% and 50%.
CONCLUSIONS
Unit trusts in Singapore showed in 1998 more diversification outside of Asia than in the two years before. This was doubtlessly induced by the Asian Financial Crisis in the fall of 1997. Also, the Singapore authorities have removed virtually all constraints on foreign investments by their unit trusts. But the Asian Financial Crisis and the increased competition had not dampened the enthusiasm for unit trusts. In the fall of 1998, many Singapore unit trusts considered it already an opportune time to bargain hunt for "sound value" in Asia. However, one of the biggest problems facing investors in Asia is the pernicious lack of information on which to base the valuation of assets.
There is an improvement in the standards of risk management practice since this survey was first taken three years ago. The survey's base has broadened from 79 in 1996 to 158 in 1998, while the response rate has successfully increased from 11.4% to 25.9%, respectively. In 1999 a base of more than 200 with a response rate of more than 30% is expected. Overall, the quality of the responses has improved and the unit trust managers have been more forthcoming with information about their average asset and sectoral allocations.
The actual disclosure standards of unit trusts in Singapore, while gradually improving, are still low in comparison to those to which private investors are now accustomed in the USA. One of the most remarkable outcomes of the 1998-Survey was the discrepancy between how much the unit trusts were willing to anonymously disclose about themselves for the purpose of this survey, and how little they actually disclosed to their own unit holders. In the USA sheer competition has driven the mutual funds to disclose their risk exposure and the analysis of their risks and their basic asset and sectoral allocations to their share holders. This is done usually in the form of standardized performance disclosure statements to private firms, which regularly monitor particular universes of mutual funds, e.g. Morningstar, Wiesenberger
Investment Companies Services, etc. The Unit Trust Research Unit of CREFS at NTU schedules a similar service in Singapore, on a trial basis, for the year 2000.
The current liberalization of the financial sector in Singapore and the subsequent increased competition is expected to force the unit trusts to improve their distribution channels, to become more user-friendly and to disclose better the magnitude and kinds of risks taken in obtaining their accumulated returns. A further increase in the sophistication of the risk analysis by better-educated and more experienced managers is also expected, with more disclosure of the analysis and managers' background to the unit holders.
In this 1998 Survey the unit trust managers in Singapore expressed a clear preference for disclosure based, market driven regulation by a private industry association. The newly formed Investment Management Association of Singapore is expected to take the lead in the education effort of both the unit trust managers and the investors' public.
